THE
CONSULTATION
PAPER
THE
CONSULTATION PAPER No
The Jersey Law Commission
was set up by a Proposition laid before the States of Jersey and approved by
the States Assembly on
The Commissioners are:
Mr David Moon, Solicitor, Chairman
Mr David Lyons, English Solicitor
Advocate Alan Binnington
Mr Clive Chaplin, Solicitor
Advocate John Wheeler
The Jersey Law Commission
invites comments on this consultation paper before
The
JE4
8PX
Fax
no: 01534 609333
THE
CONSULTATION
PAPER
THE
CONTENTS
PART I - Background
1.
The origins of
2.
The development of Jersey Customary Law
3.
Contract law in the Norman Coutume
4.
The further French influence
PART
II - Recent Practice
5.
The use of French authorities
6.
The influence of the English law of contract
7.
French influence v. English influence
8.
Other influences
9.
Recent judicial comment on sources of law
10.
A case in point: the remedy of "résolution"
11.
A comparison with the law of tort
12.
Summary of present difficulties
PART
III - Proposals
13.
Possible solutions
CONSULTATION
PAPER
THE
PART I -
Background
In
order to understand the development of
The
common law (or customary law) of
The
loss by the English Crown of its French possessions in 1204 was the time when
The
Jersey commentator Le Geyt, writing in the 17th century, explains
that Jersey originally turned to the adjacent province of Normandy because its
law was most in accordance with that of its own. Prior to 1204
The customary law of
Not all
writers are in agreement as to the importance and reliability of each of the
works. Certain writers place a high degree of significance on the fact that the
Coutume Reformée received Royal assent. Routier argued that because the Coutume
Reformée had official status it was a safer authority. He argued that because
customary law always changes without the Royal assent the coutumiers would
constantly change to reflect the customary law. As far as
It may
therefore be argued that unless a
What
is apparent, is that after 1204
This
particular point, in relation to the development of Jersey law as a whole was
emphasised by the Jersey Court of Appeal in Maynard -v- Public Services
Committee of the States of Jersey[2]
where the court warned:-
" ..care
has to be taken when referring to French legal texts in connection with the law
of
Furthermore, as
In
areas of contract law where the Norman Coutume was found lacking the general
practice was to turn to the ius commune. The ius commune has been described as a "complex result of the coming
together …of local custom with feudal law, Roman law in modified and elaborated
form, canon law and the law merchant".[3]
It
has been suggested that despite contrary belief, Jersey law was not restricted
to pre-1204 customary law and "Le
Geyt and Poingdestre make it clear that Jersey law had, by the seventeenth
century, quite pragmatically, moved on: in some respects Jersey had developed
its own law, but in other respects it continued to follow developments in
Normandy and this included looking into the ‘ius commune’ on matters of contract law ... It is thus with the sanction
of local and Norman commentators on the Norman Coutume that Jersey law looks to
mainstream civil law for its law of contract." [4]
In
practice, when looking at mainstream civil law for the purposes of contract, it
means looking to Pothier, the well-known jurist of the 19th century
who wrote on the Coutume d’Orleans.
It
is not immediately apparent precisely which French authorities should be
referred to when discussing the continued French influence. In the Law Commissioners
Report of 1861, the Commissioners reported as follows:-
"The principal authority as to the
ancient customary laws of
The Coutume
Reformée, a French compilation of a much later period (circa 1585),
representing the then existing state of the law of continental Normandy, and
the commentaries thereon of Basnage, as well as the works of other French
writers, are constantly referred to by the Jersey lawyers. The latter declare, it is true, that such
works are not of authority on Jersey law; yet in point of fact they are
frequently used as books of reference, and this has naturally, perhaps
unavoidably, led to the gradual introduction of much foreign matter, so that
what is now practically received as the common law of Jersey, may be described
as consisting of the ancient Norman law, with subsequent accretions, some of
which are mere development of the earlier customs, and others interpolations of
French law. It may be added, that the
circumstance of the
The
French jurist Pothier seems to be a consistent and favoured authority in the
The
introduction of the Code Civil in
The
French revolution marked the end of the customary law system in
"…
that a code of laws simple and clear and appropriate
to the Constitution should be drawn up"
This
resulted in the Code Civil of
The
Code Civil itself has frequently been referred to and used as an authority in
Perhaps
the most notorious cases which referred to the Code Civil are Kwanza Hotels
-v- Sogeo Co. Ltd.[6]
and Selby -v- Romeril[7]. At first instance in
"Although the "Code
Civil" represents the law of
modern France and not the "Ancienne
Coutume" of Normandy from which
the law of Jersey is drawn, I feel that, on a question such as the one I now
have to decide, he [sic] and the other authorities quoted are a surer guide to
the discovery of the Law of Jersey than is the Law of England, where, as here,
the Laws relating to real property have diverged to a real extent."
The
"It is true
that Pothier has often been treated by this court as the surest guide to the
No
doubt by extending the three requirements of a valid contract referred to by
Pothier in this way, counsel will in future cases argue that further articles
of the Code Civil should be relied upon.
Whether following the Code Civil’s lead will pose future problems
remains to be seen. It is clear that
some members of the legal profession believe that the prospect of following
There
is, of course, the practical problem that the vast majority of
PART II - Recent Practice
The
following summary of cases provides an illustration of the continued use of
French authorities to decide modern day contract issues. These cases can be contrasted with those
cases referred to later in this paper that make reference to English law
(albeit that English law was not always preferred).
This
was an action to recover unpaid rent.
The court cited Pothier (French authority) and Le Gros (
Scarfe -v- Walton[11]
This
was an action to set aside a contract on the grounds of error induced by
misrepresentation. The court referred to
Terrien (
Groom et uxor -v- Stock et uxor[12]
The court
held on the authority of Pothier (French authority) that an obligation to pay a
bonus in a contract of employment, which was entirely discretionary, was
unenforceable.
Wallis -v-
With regard to a restraint of trade clause in a
contract of employment, the court referred to the customary law maxim "la
convention fait la loi des parties" and to Pothier (French
authority) on the enforceability of contracts.
The court also referred to English authorities on restraint of trade
(see further comments on the use of English law below).
Golder -v- Société des Magasins Concorde[14]
This
was an action to set aside a disposition made by a debtor in fraud of his
creditors. The court referred to Pothier
(French authority) on the enforceability of contracts and stated that: "The principles stated by Pothier
we believe to be the principles of our law". The court also referred to Pothier (French
authority) and Dalloz (French authority) with regard to the "Pauline action" of Roman Law (i.e. an action to set
aside dispositions in fraud of creditors).
The court stated that: "the
principles of the civil law speak for us when the custom of the Duchy of
Normandy is silent".
Arbaugh -v-
With
regard to the interpretation of the terms of a contract, the court referred to
the rules of interpretation cited by Pothier (French authority).
The
Viscount brought this action to enforce a debt, transferred to him in
bankruptcy, for monies due from the defendant in respect of the en désastre company having built a house
for him. The defendant counter-claimed, relying on a penalty clause in the
contract for late completion. The court
cited Pothier (French authority) on ‘obligation
pénale’ (i.e. penalty clause) and the court stated that it believed "Pothier to be a surer guide to the
This
was an action for breach of contract by reason of defective goods. Both counsel referred to English authorities
on the question of warranty, but the court stated that "We think that on this issue Pothier is to be preferred in
this jurisdiction." The court referred to Pothier on 'vices
redhibitoires' and the conditions necessary to found an 'action redhibitoire'
(i.e. an action to set aside the contract on the ground of defects). The court held that there is no reason why
this type of action should not apply to the sale of manufactured goods, and
cited Dalloz (French authority) in support of this view. The court felt that this was simply an
extension of the principle into modern society and accordingly found for the
plaintiff on liability.
The
plaintiff sued for damages, in relation to an agreement to purchase the share
capital in the controlling company of a hotel, on the basis of
misrepresentation, express or implied warranty, and negligence. The court declined to apply the English
doctrine of negligent misrepresentation, and instead applied the
This
was an action to recover the balance due in respect of the purchase of a
car. The court stated that "mistake has long been accepted as
negativing agreement" and
referred to Pothier (French authority) on "erreur". In this regard the court observed that: "It is perhaps somewhat disappointing
that neither party chose to mine the rich lodes of our ancient French law but
to rely on English law. It may well be
that their conclusions would have been the same if they had". The court similarly
stated in relation to the equitable assignment of a debt that: "Had we had an opportunity to
examine Pothier, Domat and the doctrines of novation
we feel that our conclusion [sic] would have led us by more familiar paths to
this conclusion".
This
was an application for a contract lease to be cancelled for breaches of
covenant. The court stated that: "We do not think ... that in the
circumstances it is necessary to examine English case law in any depth. We are quite satisfied that we can draw sufficient
from the French authorities which have been stated time and time again in this
court to be preferred". The court referred to Dalloz (French
authority) and to Nicholas on the French
Law of Contract (1982) with regard to the remedy of "résolution"
under French law (i.e. the setting aside of a contract for non-performance).
This
was an application for a contract lease to be cancelled for breaches of
covenant. The court criticised counsel
for relying almost exclusively on English authorities rather than
Dempster -v- City Garage Ltd.[23]
This
case concerned a contract for the sale of a car. The question was whether the car was
roadworthy when sold and whether there was a vice caché (a hidden defect).
Norman French authorities were referred to in preference to English
authorities. The court said: "It is enough, I think, to refer to
our own Court of Appeal and, although I am not saying one ignores the English
authorities, where we have our own authorities and our own Norman French authorities, those are to be preferred in cases of this
nature, in contract." The court referred to Kwanza Hotels v Sogeo
(1983), and Pothier on "vice cachés".
Maynard -v- Public Services[24]
The
court considered the customary law maxim of "a qui est empeché d'agir la préscription ne
court point" (i.e. prescription of an action does not run
against a person who is impeded from acting) and referred to Terrien (
During
the nineteenth century there are signs that English law was regarded as of
relevance, if not as authority, with regard to contract law itself. Indeed, it is a popular misconception on the
part of the layman that the law of
During
that period it was however recognised that there was a need to protect
"If their
Lordships were to reverse these decisions without being able clearly to show
that they were contrary to the Norman law, we might not only refuse the
Respondent a right to which he is by the law of his country entitled, but might
raise a suspicion that we were desirous of changing the laws of Jersey, by
forming our decisions, not according to those laws, but according to our
English notions of justice …".[25]
Whatever
the reason, it cannot be ignored that in many of
"at
times..[it] was difficult to escape the feeling that this owed as much to the
inability or disinclination of counsel to cite proper authority to the courts
as to any considered conviction that English law was the appropriate authority
to cite, as in College -v- Little Grove Hotel Ltd[26]
[master and servant] and Denny -v- Hodge[27]
[breach of contract], where the judgments record that the parties agreed that
the principles of English law applied but not why. In other cases English law was simply cited
without comment, as in United Dominions Corporation -v- Pinglaux[28]
[hire purchase]".[29]
It
is interesting to note that prior to the time that English influence became
particularly marked in
There
are few areas of contract law where it can be said with confidence that English
law will definitely be followed. It appears that English law will be followed
in cases which are regarded as of a "specialist
nature", for example actions
arising out of building disputes where the Royal Institute of British
Architects contract has been used, as in Jersey Steel Co. Ltd. -v- Holdyne
Ltd.[30]. This only serves as another example of the
confusion the
Scarfe -v- Walton[31]
As has been
observed above, in this action to set aside a contract on the grounds of error
induced by misrepresentation, the court referred to Terrien (Norman customary
law authority) and Poingdestre (Jersey authority) to the effect that civil law
may be referred to where Norman law is silent.
The court added that: "It
has been the practice of the court for many years, in extension of the
principles enunciated by Terrien and Poingdestre, to have regard also to the
law of England where no clear precedent is to be drawn from the law of Jersey
... and, in arriving at our judgment, we have had regard to both the civil law
and to the law of England." In this case, the court justified its
reliance on English law on the grounds that the principles expounded by Domat
(French authority) had much in common with the English law of misrepresentation
and mistake although it is difficult to see how the court came to that
conclusion.
Wallis -v-
As
stated above, the court referred to English law with regard to the validity of a
restraint of trade clause in a contract of employment. The court simply stated that "by reason of the paucity of
precedents in
United Dominions Corporation -v- Pinglaux[33]
This
case concerned an exclusion clause in a contract for the hire purchase of a
motor vehicle. English case law was
cited by the court.
In
this action for breach of a contract of employment, the court noted that the
matters which justify summary termination of such a contract are set out in
Halsbury’s Laws of England.
In
this claim for breach of contract relating to the sale of a company, the court
noted that counsel agreed that the principles to be applied were those
established by English case law.
This
was an action to recover monies from the defendant under a guarantee. Le Gros (
This
case concerned the sale of aluminium cases in accordance with a sample, the
buyer rejecting the goods. The court
stated that: "We find assistance
in section 35 of the Sale of Goods Act 1893 ....."(relating
to sale by sample)"..... That Act
does not, of course, apply to
Kwanza Hotels Ltd. -v- Sogeo Company Limited[39]
The
Bailiff, at first instance, commented that in considering the law relating to
misrepresentation, "I shall
confine myself to the law of
From
the summary of the cases above, it is perhaps not surprising that members of
the legal profession in
What
is clear from the examples above, is that French law
has played, and still does play, a significant role in the development of
One
could perhaps be excused for thinking that the court itself is unclear even
when looking at French law. For example, in Warner v Hendrick.[40]
(a building case), the
Later
on in its Judgment the court referred to a further passage from Dalloz which
dealt with "verification."
This particular passage referred to a provision in the French Civil Code
and having cited the passage the Court said:
"of course,
that is an actual codification which cannot apply for we must keep ourselves
tied to the common law itself."
Thus
the Court appears to have disregarded one article of the Code on the ground
that it did not represent the common law yet almost immediately followed
another, presumably on the ground that it did represent the common law, but
without any obvious justification.
A
few years later in
"in the
absence of local authority we look for assistance either to French or English
law".
The
court then went on to consider a number of English cases and passages from
Dalloz. The court noted that:
"Mr Fielding
(counsel for the Defendant), in the absence of Norman Customary Law, looked to
English law. Mr Pallot (counsel for the Plaintiff) was able to argue that he
felt there was sufficient in Dalloz to retain us within the French sphere of
influence."
Eventually
Dalloz prevailed, the Court finding that:
"We are
quite satisfied that we can draw sufficient from the French authorities which
have been stated time and time again in this Court to be preferred".
If
one were to summarise the present position, as demonstrated by the cases
referred to above, it would seem that whilst the Royal Court is not averse to looking
at English cases when dealing with contract matters it has shown a marked
tendency to look across the water to France, albeit that it is receiving modern
French authorities without any apparent reference to whether or not such
authorities reflect principles of Norman Customary Law which pre-date the
French Civil Code. Whilst looking at French law is slightly more justifiable
than looking at English, bearing in mind the origins of the
Finally, it is worth noting that a practitioner may
need to concern himself with authorities from other jurisdictions than
"As a general rule the customary law
of Guernsey will, because of the considerable similarities in origin and
development, both Islands being part of insular Normandy, be of the highest
persuasive authority unless some reason to the contrary appears, and when the
court is dealing with older areas of customary law will supplement and
complement local authority, as in Le Cocq -v- Att. Gen.[43],
where the Royal Court turned to a Guernsey case to determine the ambit of the
role of the Attorney General…..
Because
More
recently Richard Southwell Q.C., a judge of the Court of Appeal, drew attention
to the relevance of case law from Commonwealth countries whose law derived in
whole or in part from English common law –
"… although
the influence of English law has been and continues to be profound, the courts
of Jersey will undoubtedly wish to examine also developments of the common law
elsewhere than in England and Wales so as to ensure that the law of Jersey
develops rationally and in a way consonant with the needs of the Island. This can be seen in Maynard[44]
in Solvalub Ltd -v- Match Investments Ltd[45]
(declining to follow the House of Lords in The Siskina[46]),
and the decision of the Bailiff in Knight -v- Thackeray's Ltd.[47]. At a time when the common law is being
developed so effectively in the leading Commonwealth jurisdictions, to the
extent that common law decisions are relevant in
Thus
case law from lower Canada [Quebec], (including cases decided by the Privy
Council on appeal) may provide guidance in areas of law where Jersey could
properly look to French law, because the law of Quebec derived originally from
France. The
From
the above, it has been seen that in the case of Commonwealth jurisdictions the
link is the fact that such jurisdictions and
As
Stephanie Nicolle points out:
"Where there
is no true link between the law of
In
Vaudin -v- Hamon[50]
an appeal from
"If an argument
based on analogy is to have any force, it must first be shown that the system
of law to which appeal is made in general, and moreover the particular relevant
portion of it, is similar to that which is being considered, and then that the
former has been interpreted in a manner which should call for a similar
interpretation in the latter.
While
it might be true, in a very general sense, that there is some basic similarity
between Roman law, at various periods, the various customary laws applicable in
different parts of France, the Civil Napoleonic Code, the law applicable in
Jersey and that which governs in Guernsey, this similarity is of a too general
and approximate character to be of much assistance in a particular case: it
covers, quite clearly, large differences in matters not only of detail but of
principle."
9.
Recent judicial comment on sources of law
A
recent approach to the court's use of the various sources of law is illustrated
in the case of Re Estate Father Arthur Hyne Amy[51]. This case was concerned with a will under the
Jersey law of succession, but the following views of the court may well be of
general application and may be readily applied to an analysis of the law of
contract.
At
first instance, M C St J Birt, Deputy Bailiff said:
"It has, on
a number of occasions, been said by the Court that, in one context or another,
Pothier (for example) is a "surer
guide" to discovery of the law
of
The Deputy
Bailiff continued to say that:
"In my judgment,
the use of phrases such as "a
surer guide" means simply that
there is an inclination or predisposition to follow the source said to be the
surer guide. But the Court has a choice as to whether to follow the "surer guide" or whether, in a particular case, not to follow it and adopt
principles from some other system of law (usually, in this context, although
not necessarily, English law). For example, in the law of contract, Jersey law
has chosen to follow principles of Pothier or modern French law in some areas
(e.g. cause, penalties) and principles of English law in other areas (e.g.
remoteness and measure of damages).
It
follows that, in order to enable the Court to undertake its task properly,
counsel must, in all those cases where there is a realistic possibility of the
Court deriving assistance from both English law and Norman or French law, cite
authorities from both."
The
approach expounded by the Deputy Bailiff in Re. Amy has the advantage of
being pragmatic and flexible. However,
this may be at the expense of certainty as to what exactly the law is on any
given point. Taken to its logical
extreme, the Deputy Bailiff's approach may result in the parties to a dispute
being unable to ascertain what the law is (and whether reference may be made on
a given point to French, English or other authorities) until the court is asked
to decide the point. The Deputy
Bailiff's line of reasoning is arguably difficult to justify on jurisprudential
grounds, since it must be an essential requirement of an effective legal system
that there is certainty as to the law.
The
approach expounded by the Deputy Bailiff in Re. Amy may be said to
simply be an acknowledgment of what the court has always done. That is to say, it illustrates a flexible
approach which allows for the "cherry-picking" of legal principles from Norman,
French, English and other sources of law.
The cynic may regard this as a device employed by judges for the
adoption or rejection of doctrine according to the inclination of the judges to
do justice in the particular circumstances of a case.
10.
A case in point:
the remedy of "résolution"
A
consideration of the contractual concept of "résolution" may be used
further to illustrate both the issues discussed above and also the
uncertainties that are inherent in seeking to ascertain the
In
the Jersey case of Hotel de France -v- Chartered Institute of Bankers[53]
the court referred to Nicholas on "The
French Law of Contract" and
appeared to imply that under Jersey law a party must apply to the Royal Court
for an order to rescind a contract for non-performance, save in exceptional
circumstances.
In
an article in the Jersey Law Review, Advocate T J Le Cocq argued that there is
no such requirement (with the exception of contracts relating to land and
leases) to commence proceedings before the Royal Court to cancel a contract for
non-performance or fundamental breach:
"There
appear to be no examples contained in the Jersey Law Reports or in the Table
des Décisions of cases in which the Royal Court has been asked to rescind a
contract (other than a lease) or in some other way has been asked by a
plaintiff to declare that he is no longer bound by the terms of such a
contract. [...] It is submitted that it is highly suggestive
that neither the judiciary nor the legal profession in Jersey has believed
since 1885 that there was a requirement to apply to court to be released from a
contract where the other party had failed to perform [...] Not only are there
no examples of the court being asked to cancel a contract for non-performance
by one of the parties but, indeed, there is clear indication that the Royal
Court has proceeded on the basis that Jersey law tends to follow English legal
principles when considering the circumstances and manner in which a contract
may be rescinded for want of performance by one party to it."
The
article refers to several local cases in support of this view (Hanby -v- Moss,
United Dominions -v Le Comte, New Guarantee -v- Birbeck, and R. H. Edwards -v-
Tretol Paint Systems). The author
submits that
"The
importance of a cogent, modern and efficient contractual context for
In
a subsequent article in the Jersey Law Review, Advocate J Kelleher wrote, with
regard to the local cases to which Advocate Le Cocq referred in support of his
view that English principles are applicable, that:
"[N]o
reference to Pothier or other French authority appears to have been placed
before the Court in these cases. And
here is the catch. How can it be that
decisions of the Court where the appropriate authorities were not considered,
let alone referred, are to be considered as authority for the
With
regard to Advocate Le Cocq's opinion that
"If this
were so, it would lead to an odd result: contracts are created following French
principles [i.e. as per Selby -v- Romeril[54],
see above] but are terminated following English principles; a recipe for
confusion if ever there was one. More
importantly however, is not the reality that for one reason
or another, the Court's decisions are flawed: flawed because they rely
on no relevant authority; because the proper sources were not put before them;
and because ultimately the legal reasoning (such as there is) places pragmatism
ahead of consistency with
Advocate
Kelleher concluded on a general note as follows:
"Ultimately,
the argument as to reliance upon the English law of contract rather than the
French law of obligations rests on a legitimate concern to ensure consistency
and a uniform approach, coupled with a desire not to embarrass a small
jurisdiction keen to show its calibre to the outside world. However, in my submission the real cause for
concern is the attempts to adopt English contract law on an ad hoc
basis. It may be that an English speaking
Island whose courts are peopled with lawyers and judges trained in
The
most recent judicial comment made by the Royal Court with regard to the
question of "résolution" is to be found in R A Rossborough
(Insurance Brokers) Ltd -v- Boon & Aziz[55] where M C St J Birt, Deputy Bailiff said:
"To insist
that, however serious the breach by the other party, a party to a contract
cannot treat the contract as being at an end so that he is relieved of his
obligation to continue to perform his side of the bargain, but has to go to
Court to seek a discretionary decision as to whether the contract should in
fact be ended, would seem to be very undesirable. It would mean that the
innocent party would not know where he stood until a decision by the Court some
months or even years later. We must emphasise that we have not heard any
argument on this matter but our initial reaction is that we would be reluctant
to find that the law of
From
the above, it has been seen that a consideration of the contractual principle
of "résolution" clearly illustrates the dichotomy between
an approach which holds the Norman French roots of
11.
A comparison with the law of tort
The debate on the proper
sources of the law of contract may be further illuminated by a comparison with
the position in
Under English law, the law of
tort provides that a liability arises from the breach of a duty towards persons
generally which is fixed by the law. A
breach of such a duty (e.g. by reason of negligence, nuisance or trespass to
the person) is redressible by damages.
With regard to the influence
of English law on the law of tort in
"Though English influence may have come late to the law of
tort [in
In Watson -v- Priddy[56],
the Court cited the definition of a "tort" from an English authority. The Plaintiff had argued that the court
should apply the wider Norman conception of a "tort",
but the court held that the definition of "tort" from the English authority equally
applied to a tort in
With regard to the direct
influence of English law in matters of tort in
"By and large this creates no particular problems. It does however run into conceptual
difficulties in that area of law where neighbouring property owners dispute
over an alleged injury which in the English system is classified as a tort
(whether negligence, nuisance or trespass to property), but in Jersey sits more
comfortably as part of that area relating to property law known as voisinage
which deals with reciprocal rights and obligations of neighbouring property
owners. In Searley -v- Dawson[58]
a case concerned with the right of support owed by neighbouring properties to
each other, the Royal Court considered the English principles of negligence
before giving it up as a bad job and falling back gratefully onto the familiar
authority of Domat and Pothier."
However, it would appear that
despite such conceptual difficulties where tort overlaps with property law, the
law of tort in
For the purpose of the
present analysis of the law of contract, it is arguable that if the adoption
many years ago of a system of tort based upon and guided by the principles of
English common law has proved to be effective, then perhaps such an adoption of
English law principles could work as effectively in the field of the Jersey law
of contract.
12.
Summary of present difficulties in ascertaining the
law of contract
(i) Accessibility of Norman texts
For
a legal system to function efficiently, the law must be readily accessible,
both to lawyers and, indeed, to the layman.
Although reports of
(ii) Language
Apart from the translations to which we have referred
in the preceding paragraph, works on Norman customary law and on more modern
French law are almost exclusively written in the French language. Despite the
(iii) The
Difficulty of Applying Ancient Concepts
If one is to have regard to the Jersey Law of Contract
in its purest form and to accept that the primary source material, in the
absence of decided
(iv) Uncertainty
It is fundamental to any legal system that the law
should, so far as is practicable, be applied consistently. An examination of the cases referred to
earlier in this consultation paper suggests that in relation to the law of
contract the legal system to which the court will look depends to a large
extent on the identity of the judges sitting on a particular case and of the
counsel appearing before them. Those who
have an affinity with Norman concepts are likely to reject any reliance on
English contractual principles whilst those who feel less comfortable with
Norman concepts seem willing to reject them in favour of the application of
English law.
(v) A legal system for the modern world
of commerce?
Critics of
the
Some
might argue that
It
is further arguable that if a legal system is to serve the interests of society
it must develop with the changing needs of the society but must nevertheless
retain a significant degree of certainty.
The
As
one author has said:
"It is clear
... that in the area of contract as in many other areas of Jersey law, the
Royal Court has simply "cherry
picked" elements from both the
English and the French legal systems without laying down or following any
consistent guidelines with regard to the sources of law to which the Courts
will have regard. Although this approach
may have advantages in terms of flexibility, it has resulted in a degree of
uncertainty and confusion which cannot but prejudice the interests of litigants
before the
Although
it is apparent that Jersey does have a wealth of authority and material to draw
upon when debating contractual issues, the texts are not necessarily accessible
to the average lay person or even to many practitioners.
Whilst it may not necessarily be fair to say that the
legal system has failed to keep pace with changing times, there are many
reasons why the
In one view:-
"the material is there for the taking and for developing it into
local jurisprudence. Modern French
writers on the code civil are accessible and readily comprehensible. Provided a
suitable linkage with Pothier can be traced and it is clear that no statute has
interposed to change the ‘ius commune’
on the point, an answer to most legal questions is attainable. If
PART III - Proposals
13.
(i) Codification
One
solution to the present unsatisfactory state of affairs would be a codification
of
Given
the varying sources used by the
Given
the
ii) Incorporation of English law by
statute
An
alternative solution would be to adopt, by statute, the present English common
law relating to contract. It is worth
noting that in the 1580’s a Guernsey work was produced know as the "Approbation des loix" which went through the Ancienne
Coutume article by article, approving, qualifying or rejecting its provisions
in accordance with the practice in Guernsey.
This work was ratified by Order in Council of
It
seems to us that the statutory adoption of the English common law of contract
need not be particularly problematic: the
iii) A greater degree of consistency
Finally,
the
iv) Conclusion
Whilst
the various possible solutions have their own benefits and disadvantages there
is a perception that any move towards English law would be a loss of yet
another aspect of the
"I am conscious of the pride which
the legal profession in this
There
is no obvious answer to resolving the problem that we have identified. On balance, we presently favour the
incorporation of English law by statute on the basis of the relative speed by
which it could be carried out, its lack of a negative effect in terms of the
Island's suitability for doing business and the fact that it probably reflects
the impression, albeit mistaken, that the majority of islanders have of the
basis of the Jersey law of contract.
************
Responses to this
Consultation Paper should be made in writing, by
The
JE4 8PX
Fax no. 01534 609333
************
[1] See J
Kelleher, "The sources of Jersey
Contract law" 3
[2] (1996) JLR 343
[3] See Robinson, Fergus and Gordon’s "European Legal History"
[4] J
Kelleher, "The Sources of
[5] J
Kelleher, "The Sources of
Contract Law" 3
[6] (1981) JJ 59 and (1983) JJ 105
[7] (1996) JLR 210
[8] (1981) JJ 59
[9] J
Kelleher, "The Sources of
[10] (1950) JJ 5
[11] (1964) JJ 387
[12] (1965) JJ 429
[13] (1965) JJ 455
[14] (1967) JJ 721
[15] (1967) JJ 745
[16] (1969) JJ 1243
[17] (1976) JJ 415
[18] (1977) JJ 111
[19] (1978) JJ 39
[20] 1989 JLR 312
[21] 1990 JLR 228
[22] 1991 JLR 197
[23] (
[24] (1996) Unrep 236
[25]
[26] (1970) JJ 1487
[27] (1971) JJ 1915
[28] (1960) JJ 1123
[29] S Nicolle QC, "The Origin and Development of Jersey Law" at paragraph 15.17
[30] (1972) JJ 2009
[31] (1964) JJ 387
[32] (1965) JJ 455
[33] (1969) JJ 1123
[34] (1970) JJ 1487
[35] (1971) JJ 1915
[37] (1972) JJ 2127
[38] (1982) Unrep 1
[39] (1981) JJ 59 and (1983) JJ 105
[40] (1985-86) JLR 366
[41] 1990 JLR 228
[42] 1992 JLR 6
[43] 1991 JLR 169 at 195
[44] 1996 JLR 343
[45] 1996 JLR 361
[46] (1979) AC 210
[47] 1997 JLR 279
[48] Southwell, "A note
on the sources of Jersey Law"
[1999] 3
[49] 1992 JLR 6
[50] [1974] A.C. at 581-582
[51] (2000) Unreported 57
[52] See
[53] (
[54] (1996) JLR 210
[55] (2001) Unrep 157
[56] (1977) JJ 145
[57] (1995)
JLR 208 (R.C.); 1997 JLR 176 (
[58] (1971) JJ 1687
[59] J
Kelleher, 3
[60] J
Kelleher, 3
[61] (1985-86) J.L.R. 186 at 195